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INTRODUCTION 
Substantial confusion exists about the standards federal courts must 
apply to determine whether to grant injunctions for state-law claims. This 
issue may arise in several different contexts,1 including diversity cases,2 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. Climenko Fellow and Lecturer 
on Law, Harvard Law School, 2012–14; Yale Law School, J.D., 2003; Princeton University, 
Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs, A.B., magna cum laude, 2000. Special 
thanks to Caprice Roberts for her help in developing this topic. I am grateful to Michael Green, 
Camilla Alexandra Hrdy, Tracy Thomas, and the participants at the University of Akron School of 
Law symposium on “Erie at Eighty” for their valuable comments and feedback. I also appreciate the 
invaluable aid of Mary McCormick of the Florida State University College of Law Research Center, 
as well as research assistance from Lindsey Boudreau. I dedicate this piece to my wonderful sons, 
Zachary Blaise Morley and Nicholas William Morley. 
1. Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunction Standards in Massachusetts State and Federal
Courts, 35 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 41 (2013).  
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), (d)(2) (2011). 
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supplemental jurisdiction cases,3 and those in which a state-law claim 
raises a “disputed and substantial” federal issue.4 Much of this uncertainty 
arises from an anachronistic exception the Supreme Court created to the 
principles set forth in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.5 
Erie famously abolished general law, requiring federal courts to 
apply state substantive law when adjudicating claims arising under state 
law.6 Seven years later, in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, the Supreme Court 
held that federal courts must nevertheless continue to apply traditional 
equitable remedial principles tracing back to the English Court of 
Chancery in all cases that come before them, including state-law cases.7 
Since injunctions are a form of equitable relief,8 Guaranty Trust requires 
federal courts to apply this body of traditional equitable principles—as 
interpreted by the federal courts themselves—when considering 
injunctive relief for state-law claims.9 The Court has distilled these 
traditional principles into four-factor tests for preliminary10 and 
permanent11 injunctions. While some circuits expressly follow Guaranty 
Trust, others appear to be unaware of the ruling and apply their own 
varying approaches to determining the proper standards for injunctive 
relief for state-law claims.12 
Guaranty Trust is wrong, erroneously treating equitable remedial 
principles as a lingering remnant of general law. In previous work, I 
explained that there is not a single uniform body of transcendental 
equitable remedial principles that federal courts must apply in all cases 
that come before them.13 Rather, the body of equitable principles that 
applies to a claim depends on the source of law from which the claim 
arises.14 For claims arising under state law, a federal court must apply that 
state’s body of equitable principles.15 
3. Id. § 1367(a) (2011). 
4. See Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005); 28 
U.S.C. § 1331 (2011). 
5. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6. Id. at 78–80. 
7. 326 U.S. 99, 105–06 (1945). 
8. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311 (1982) (“It goes without saying that an 
injunction is an equitable remedy.”). 
9. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 105–06.
10. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
11. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006); see infra notes 142–43 and 
accompanying text.  
12. See infra notes 52–55, 97 and accompanying text.
13. Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217, 257 (2018).
14. Id. at 275. 
15. Id.
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Building on that previous work, this article focuses on a different 
aspect of the issue. Federal courts frequently attempt to avoid choosing 
between federal and state equitable remedial principles when deciding 
whether to grant injunctive relief for state-law claims. Such courts usually 
declare that, since the relevant state’s standards are materially identical to 
federal standards, or the litigants did not identify any differences between 
the two tests, they may simply apply federal equitable principles and, 
implicitly, federal precedents applying them.16 This article argues that this 
dodge is invariably inaccurate; courts may not evade this important Erie 
issue so easily. 
State standards for injunctive relief often involve somewhat different 
elements or are expressed in subtly different terms than federal standards. 
Even when state and federal factors governing injunctive relief appear 
identical, the manner in which different court systems have applied or 
construed them may substantially differ. When state and federal courts 
both require plaintiffs to demonstrate “irreparable injury” or the absence 
of an “adequate remedy at law,” for example, they often disagree over 
whether certain harms qualify as irreparable or a potential remedy 
qualifies as adequate. 
More broadly, different bodies of precedent provide different legal 
backdrops for adjudicating contested issues. Each element or factor of a 
doctrinal test from a particular jurisdiction should be viewed as a proxy 
for the body of precedent from that jurisdiction explaining or applying it. 
Each jurisdiction’s precedents concerning an issue constitute a distinct, 
even unique, set of guideposts for adjudicating it. Federal and state courts’ 
bodies of precedent concerning concepts like irreparability should not be 
treated as fungible, because they inevitably are comprised of different 
constellations of adjudicated fact patterns. Thus, even when federal and 
state standards for injunctive relief appear superficially identical, federal 
courts should still begin by determining which set of standards—and 
hence which body of precedent—governs state-law claims.17 
Part I of this article begins by delving more deeply into Guaranty 
Trust’s “equitable remedial rights doctrine,” which requires federal courts 
to apply a uniform body of federal equitable principles when deciding 
whether to grant injunctive relief for state-law claims. It then outlines my 
previous critique of the doctrine, summarizing why a federal court should 
16. See infra note 141.
17. Moreover, the Supreme Court should overturn Guaranty Trust and hold that federal courts 
must apply state-law standards, including state-court precedents applying them, cf. Erie, 304 U.S. at 
78–79, to determine the availability of equitable relief for state-law claims, while federal standards 
govern equitable relief for federal claims. Morley, supra note 13, at 275.   
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apply state-law standards, as construed by the courts of that state, to 
resolve such issues.18 This part goes on to explain why this approach 
should apply equally to preliminary injunctions, which nearly every 
circuit in the nation erroneously treats as a procedural matter governed by 
federal law.19 
Part II demonstrates that federal courts cannot avoid this choice-of-
law problem, even when the federal and state requirements for injunctive 
relief appear identical. Most basically, facial disparities may exist 
between seemingly similar sets of standards that can create subtle, yet 
meaningful, differences in their requirements. And even when federal and 
state standards are completely identical, disparities inevitably exist 
between the bodies of caselaw construing them. Federal and state courts 
may interpret and apply identical elements differently. Even in the 
absence of direct conflicts between federal and state precedents, one court 
system may have squarely addressed certain issues that the other has not 
yet specifically resolved. Perhaps most importantly, the specific fact 
patterns of the cases adjudicated in each system will always differ, 
providing different sets of guideposts to influence a court’s exercise of its 
equitable discretion. 
Part III concludes by exploring other circumstances in which courts 
should resolve choice-of-law issues concerning the standards governing 
injunctive relief, rather than simply declaring competing sets of potential 
standards to be identical. Most obviously, state courts should apply federal 
law in reverse-Erie cases in which they must decide whether to grant 
injunctive relief under federal statutes, even if federal and state standards 
appear similar. Correspondingly, when deciding whether to grant an 
injunction in a traditional choice-of-law case, the court should apply the 
standards of the state whose substantive law gave rise to the underlying 
cause of action. 
More generally, even outside the context of injunctions, declining to 
determine which jurisdiction’s law governs an issue when the elements of 
competing jurisdictions’ standards are similar or identical can lead to 
inaccurate results. It ignores the numerous ways in which different 
jurisdictions’ bodies of precedent applying and interpreting those 
standards inevitably differ. Rather than taking competing legal standards 
at face value, courts should view them as proxies for distinct, and 
inevitably differing, bodies of caselaw crafted by different court systems. 
18. See Morley, supra note 13, at 275.
19. See infra note 97.
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I. INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR STATE-LAW CLAIMS IN FEDERAL COURT 
Many U.S. Courts of Appeals follow Guaranty Trust’s “equitable 
remedial rights doctrine” in deciding whether to grant permanent 
injunctions for state-law claims. Under this doctrine, federal courts must 
apply an independent body of equitable principles tracing back to the 
English Court of Chancery, as interpreted by the federal judiciary itself, 
to decide whether to grant equitable relief. And virtually every circuit 
applies these traditional principles in deciding whether to grant 
preliminary injunctions for state-law claims, as well, albeit for somewhat 
different reasons. This part surveys the current state of the law, briefly 
outlines my objections to the equitable remedial rights doctrine, and 
responds to the major counterarguments to my critique. It begins by 
discussing permanent injunctions, then turns to the special considerations 
that apply exclusively to preliminary injunctions. 
A. Guaranty Trust and Permanent Injunctions 
Equitable remedies remain a glaring exception to the Erie doctrine. 
In Erie, the Supreme Court held that federal courts may no longer craft 
and apply their own body of general law in diversity cases.20 Rather, a 
federal court sitting in diversity must use state law, including common-
law holdings from state judicial opinions, as the rule of decision21 unless 
the U.S. Constitution, a federal statute, or federal common law governs 
the issue.22 Erie attempted to ensure that both the federal and state courts 
within a state apply that state’s law uniformly.23 Hanna v. Plumer later 
added that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may also displace state law,24 
so long as they are authorized by the Rules Enabling Act.25 
20. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1938). 
21. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (formerly codified at 28 U.S.C. § 724
(1938), presently codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012)).  
22. Erie, 304 U.S. at 72–73 (“[I]n all matters except those in which some federal law is
controlling, the federal courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases would apply as 
their rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten as well as written.”). Although Justice Brandeis 
boldly proclaimed in Erie, “There is no federal common law,” he gave lie to that assertion in another 
ruling he authored and issued the same day, Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 
304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). Hinderlider held, “[W]hether the water of an interstate stream must be 
apportioned between . . . two States is a question of ‘federal common law’ upon which neither the 
statutes nor the decisions or either State can be conclusive.” Id.  
23. Erie, 304 U.S. at 75. 
24. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
25. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1990). 
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Justice Felix Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court in Guaranty Trust 
created an anomalous exception to these principles.26 Guaranty Trust 
confirmed that the Erie doctrine generally applies equally to state-law 
claims regardless of whether they arise at law or in equity, requiring 
federal courts to apply state law—including state court precedents—when 
determining litigants’ substantive rights in diversity cases.27 Erie itself 
had addressed only common-law cases. It focused in part on the proper 
interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act28 which, at the time, applied 
only to actions at law.29 
Notwithstanding this expansion of Erie, however, Guaranty Trust 
went on to hold that uniform federal standards continue to govern the 
availability of equitable relief in federal court, even for claims arising 
under state law.30 Guaranty Trust explained that, while federal courts 
sitting in equity must respect the substantive rights states recognize, 
“[t]his does not mean that whatever equitable remedy is available in a 
State court must be available in a diversity suit in federal court, or 
conversely, that a federal court may not afford an equitable remedy not 
available in a State court.”31 It held that a federal court may grant equitable 
relief only if a claim is “within the traditional scope of equity as 
historically evolved in the English Court of Chancery.”32 
26. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
27. Id. at 111 (“To make an exception to Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins on the equity side of a federal 
court is to reject the considerations of policy which, after long travail, led to that decision.”). The 
Court had previously declared, without explanation or analysis, that “[t]he decision in Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins. . . . applies though the question of construction arises not in an action at law, but in a suit 
in equity.” Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 205 (1938). 
28. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (formerly codified at 28 U.S.C. § 724
(1938), presently codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012)). 
29. Erie, 304 U.S. at 71. 
30. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 105. 
31. Id. The Court later reiterated, “State law cannot define the remedies which a federal court 
must give simply because a federal court in diversity jurisdiction is available as an alternative tribunal 
to the State’s courts. Contrariwise, a federal court may afford an equitable remedy for a substantive 
right recognized by a State even though a State court cannot give it.” Id. at 106.  
32. Id. at 105. The opinion later noted that, historically, federal courts “enforced State-created 
substantive rights” in diversity cases only “if the mode of proceeding and remedy were consonant 
with the traditional body of equitable remedies, practice and procedure.” Id. at 106.  
Wright & Miller’s treatise construes Guaranty Trust somewhat narrowly, suggesting qual-
ifications on the equitable remedial rights doctrine that do not appear in the opinion itself. 
The treatise interprets Guaranty Trust as concluding that, when state law either “does not 
provide a specific remedy” or “generally proscribes a remedy similar to traditional equi-
table relief,” a federal court may apply federal standards in deciding whether to grant an 
injunction, “because no real conflict is presented.” CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2943 (3d ed. 1995). The treatise also contends that federal 
courts adjudicating state-law claims may “resort[] to the flexibility of their equity powers” 
instead of employing state-law standards “in exceptional cases in order to effect justice 
6
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Guaranty Trust did not explain the source of this limitation. The 
cases the Court cited, however,33 declare that this restriction arose from 
the Judiciary Act’s grant of jurisdiction to federal courts over cases in 
equity.34 That jurisdictional grant confers “an authority to administer in 
equity suits the principles of the system of judicial remedies” that the 
English Court of Chancery employed at the time of American 
independence.35 The grant implicitly “prescribes the body of doctrine 
which is to guide [federal courts’] decisions and enable them to 
determine” when equitable relief is “appropriate.”36 Those cases, in turn, 
rely on a series of pre-Erie precedents that likewise interpret grants of 
expeditiously or creatively and in a manner consistent with the substance of state-created 
rights of the parties.” Id. § 4513. They must exercise this discretion, however, “with con-
siderable delicacy.” Id. Moore’s treatise does not discuss Guaranty Trust in this context. 
See 13 JAMES WM. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE - CIVIL § 65.07[2] (2013). 
33. Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939); Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l 
Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939).  
34. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (formerly codified at 28 U.S.C. § 41(1)); 
cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2. 
35. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 306 U.S. at 568; see also Sprague, 307 U.S. at 164–65 (“The suits ‘in 
equity’ of which [federal] courts were given ‘cognizance’ ever since the First Judiciary Act, 
constituted that body of remedies, procedures and practices which theretofore had been evolved in 
the English Court of Chancery, subject, of course, to modifications by Congress.”).  
Atlas is the first post-Erie case to trace a federal court’s duty to apply a uniform body of 
federal equitable principles in diversity cases to the statute granting federal courts juris-
diction over cases in equity. The Atlas Court emphasized that federal standards govern not 
only the scope of a federal court’s equitable jurisdiction, but also a litigant’s entitlement 
to equitable relief. The plaintiff insurance company had filed a diversity suit in federal 
court to cancel insurance policies it had issued, alleging that the insured had lied on his 
application. Atlas, 306 U.S. at 566–67. The beneficiary had already sued the insurance 
company in state court for the policies’ proceeds. Id. at 566. The Supreme Court held that 
the federal suit fell within the district court’s equitable jurisdiction because the insurance 
company lacked an adequate remedy at law. Id. at 569. The insurance company’s ability 
to assert a fraud defense in the pending state court proceedings did not preclude federal 
equitable jurisdiction; because a remedy at law was deemed adequate only if a litigant 
could assert it in federal court. Id.  
The Atlas Court further held, however, that while the district court had equitable jurisdic-
tion over the case, the company was not entitled to equitable relief under traditional prin-
ciples because it did not face irreparable injury. Id. The company’s apparent ability to 
assert a fraud defense in state court alleviated any threat posed by the allegedly invalid 
insurance policies. Id. at 570–71 (“[T]he insurance company’s defense may be protected 
[in state court] as well as in a federal court, and in that case there is no threat of irreparable 
injury.”). The Court derived this irreparable injury requirement from the traditional prin-
ciples governing equitable relief, which applied as a result of Congress’s grant of equity 
jurisdiction to federal courts. Id. at 568, 571; see also Sprague, 307 U.S. at 167 (holding 
that, where a trust beneficiary successfully sued in equity and set a precedent that would 
aid identically situated beneficiaries suing the same defendant, the district court had dis-
cretion under traditional equitable principles to award a portion of those other beneficiar-
ies’ trusts in the defendant’s possession to the plaintiff to defray its attorneys’ fees).  
36. Atlas Life Ins. Co., 306 U.S. at 568. 
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equity jurisdiction to the federal courts as requiring them to apply 
traditional equitable principles.37 
Guaranty Trust also identified other, more limited constraints that 
contributed to disparities in the availability of equitable relief in state and 
federal court. It noted that Section 16 of the Judiciary Act—which has 
since been repealed and lacks any current statutory analogue38—allowed 
federal courts to exercise equitable jurisdiction over a case only when no 
“plain, adequate and complete remedy at law”39 was available in federal 
court.40 Moreover, federal laws such as the Norris-LaGuardia Act41 limit 
federal courts’ equitable powers in certain kinds of cases, such as labor 
disputes.42 And the Seventh Amendment43 requires trial by jury in cases 
that traditionally would have been considered legal rather than 
equitable.44 These other constraints, however, do not support Guaranty 
Trust’s broad holding that federal courts must apply an independent body 
of traditional equitable principles in deciding whether to grant equitable 
relief in all cases that come before them, including cases arising under 
state law. 
Guaranty Trust is consistent with another post-Erie Frankfurter 
opinion issued only a few years earlier, Sprague v. Ticonic National 
Bank.45 Sprague held that a federal court must apply traditional equitable 
principles rather than state law to decide whether to award attorneys’ fees 
in a diversity case in equity. The plaintiff had deposited funds in trust with 
the defendant bank, which used them to purchase certain bonds.46 When 
the bank became insolvent, the plaintiff successfully sued to impose a lien 
on the proceeds from the sale of those bonds.47 She asked the court to 
37. See, e.g., Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1868) (“The equity jurisdiction
conferred on the Federal courts is the same that the High Court of Chancery in England possesses; is 
subject to neither limitation or restraint by State legislation, and is uniform throughout the different 
States of the Union.”); Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222 (1818) (“[T]he remedies 
in the courts of the United States, are to be, at common law or in equity, not according to the practice 
of state courts, but according to the principles of common law and equity, as distinguished and defined 
in that country from which we derive our knowledge of those principles.”).  
38. See H.R. REP. NO. 80-308 at A236 (1947).
39. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 384 
(1946), repealed Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat 869, 996). 
40. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105 (1945). 
41. Norris-LaGuardia Act, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 101-
–104 (1934)). 
42. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 105. 
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
44. Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 105 (citing Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146 (1891)).
45. 307 U.S. 161 (1939). 
46. Id. at 162. 
47. Id.
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award her attorneys’ fees out of bond proceeds the bank owed other, 
similarly situated depositors. She claimed that, because the precedent she 
had set confirmed those other depositors’ rights against the bank, they 
should bear part of her litigation costs.48 The Supreme Court held that the 
district court should have applied traditional equitable principles in 
deciding whether to grant the request.49 Under those traditional principles, 
the court had discretion to treat the matter as equivalent to a common fund 
case, in which a litigant who wins a pool of money that will benefit 
numerous rightholders may recover attorneys’ fees from those funds.50 
Reiterating a principle that the Court had repeatedly applied in equity 
cases throughout the pre-Erie era, Sprague declared, “The suits ‘in equity’ 
of which these courts were given ‘cognizance’ ever since the First 
Judiciary Act, constituted that body of remedies, procedures and practices 
which theretofore had been evolved in the English Court of Chancery, 
subject, of course, to modifications by Congress.”51 Thus, even after Erie, 
the Court treated Congress’s grant of equity jurisdiction to the federal 
judiciary as not simply conferring power on federal courts to adjudicate 
cases in equity, but also presumptively requiring them to apply traditional 
equitable remedial principles in such cases, as well. 
Several circuits, recognizing the continued vitality of Guaranty 
Trust’s equitable remedial rights doctrine, have held that federal courts 
must apply this uniform body of traditional equitable principles as 
interpreted by federal courts, rather than state law, in deciding whether to 
48. Id. at 163. 
49. Id. at 164–65.
50. Id. at 166. 
51. Sprague, 307 U.S. at 164. 
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grant injunctions52 or other forms of equitable relief53 in diversity cases. 
Other rulings recognize the doctrine’s continued vitality without 
52. See, e.g., SSMC, Inc. v. Steffen, 102 F.3d 704, 708 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that Guaranty 
Trust permits a federal court sitting in diversity to award injunctive relief regardless of whether the 
state’s version of the UCC permits it, because the court’s “equitable powers can extend to setting 
aside or enjoining the enforcement of rights purportedly created by a tainted transaction” (citation 
omitted)); Perfect Fit Indus. v. Acme Quilting Co., 646 F.2d 800, 805-06 (2d Cir. 1981) (upholding a 
recall order in a diversity case as “well within the district court’s broad powers as a court of equity,” 
even though it was an “unusual, and perhaps unprecedented, remedy for a violation of New York’s 
law of unfair competition” because, under Guaranty Trust, “[s]tate law does not govern the scope of 
the equity powers of the federal court . . . even when state law supplies the rule of decision”); Clark 
Equip. Co. v. Armstrong Equip. Co., 431 F.2d 54, 57 (5th Cir. 1970) (“Neither the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure nor the Erie doctrine deprive[s] Federal courts in diversity cases of the power to 
enforce State-created substantive rights by well-recognized equitable remedies even though such 
remedy might not be available in the courts of the State.” (citing Guaranty Trust)); accord Crossno 
v. Crossno, No. 87-762, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5637, at *3 (E.D. La. June 18, 1987) (“[P]laintiff is
entitled to the equitable remedy of injunction even though that remedy might not be available to a 
state court litigant.” (citing Clark Equip. Co.)); see also Sindi v. El-Mosalimany, 896 F.3d 1, 40 n.22 
(1st Cir. 2018) (Barron, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“‘[E]quitable relief in a federal 
court is of course subject to restrictions’—including that ‘the suit must be within the traditional scope 
of equity as historically evolved in the English Court of Chancery.’” (quoting Guaranty Trust)); 
Bacardi & Co. v. N.Y. Lighter Co., No. 97-CV-7140 (JS) (WDW), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19852, at 
*47–49 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2000) (holding that, even though an order to seize goods that infringed the 
plaintiff’s trademark was not authorized by federal trademark law, such relief was a valid exercise of 
the court’s “traditional equitable powers as well as Rule 65” to remedy violations of the plaintiff’s 
rights under state trademark and unfair competition law).  
53. See, e.g., Canada Life Assur. Co. v. LaPeter, 563 F.3d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying 
federal standards for appointing receivers (citing Guaranty Trust)); Rodriguez v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 
257 F. Supp. 3d 840, 851 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (holding that federal equitable principles governed the 
availability of attorneys’ fees for a defendant that successfully defended against the plaintiff’s state-
law claim, even where its contract with the plaintiff authorized their recovery (citing Guaranty 
Trust)); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., MDL No. 2036, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190562, at 
*42 n.3 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2013) (holding federal law governed attorneys’ fees in a common fund
diversity case arising under state law (citing Clark Equip. Co.)); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Am. 
Plumbing & Sup. Co., 19 F.R.D. 334, 345 (E.D. Wis. 1956) (citing Guaranty Trust and applying 
independent federal standards for imposing a constructive trust in a diversity case); see also Mintzer 
v. Arthur L. Wright & Co., 263 F.2d 823, 826 (3d Cir. 1959) (Goodrich, J., concurring) (declaring,
with regard to receiverships, “we do not feel bound by state law in determining whether an equitable 
remedy is to be given or whether a plaintiff is relegated to his remedies at law”); Canal Ins. Co. v. 
Flores, No. 3:06-CV-84-KC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37013, at *51 n.20 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2009) 
(reiterating “a federal court is not deprived of equitable remedies simply because those equitable 
remedies do not exist in state courts” and concluding that state laws may neither limit the federal 
declaratory judgment remedy nor alter its equitable nature (citing Guaranty Trust)). But see 
Zippertubing Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 757 F.2d 1401, 1411 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that state law governs 
the availability of accounting as a remedy in diversity suits because “[t]he equitable or legal nature of 
the relief does not relieve the federal forum of the obligation to afford the same relief which a state 
court would afford with respect to state law claims”); Cendant Corp. v. Forbes, 70 F. Supp. 2d 339, 
344–45 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that Guaranty Trust’s equitable remedial rights doctrine must give 
way to the Erie doctrine, since the former is statutory and the latter is constitutional). 
10
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addressing its precise scope.54 Some circuits have adopted conflicting 
positions in separate opinions that neither engage with each other nor 
recognize the intracircuit conflict.55 The Supreme Court, for its part, has 
declined subsequent opportunities to address, clarify, or reconsider the 
issue.56 
I have explained in previous work that Guaranty Trust’s preservation 
of the equitable remedial rights doctrine is inconsistent with Erie from 
54. See, e.g., Niemi v. Lasshofer, 728 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2013) (recognizing viability 
of equitable remedial rights doctrine under Guaranty Trust); Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 682 F.2d 
1311, 1319 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982) (rejecting the premise “that state law necessarily controls all questions 
of . . . equitable remedies” in diversity cases); Hertz v. Record Publ’g Co. of Erie, 219 F.2d 397, 398 
n.2 (3d Cir. 1955) (“[A] federal court can enforce a state-created substantive right and fashion its own 
remedy, especially where the result would be substantially the same as in a state proceeding. Federal 
remedies are not limited or affected by state law.”).  
Other rulings approvingly quote the key language from Guaranty Trust out of context in 
disputes over procedural rules rather than equitable remedies. See, e.g., Bryan v. Kershaw, 
366 F.2d 497, 504 n.5 (5th Cir. 1966) (quoting Guaranty Trust in support of applying 
federal rather than state pleading standards to a prayer for injunctive relief); Oskoian v. 
Canuel, 269 F.2d 311, 316 (1st Cir. 1959) (quoting Guaranty Trust in support of applying 
Rule 23, rather than state law, to determine the propriety of class certification in a federal 
case involving both federal and state-law claims); E. Sav. Bank, FSB v. Souphaphone, No. 
3:13-CV-01459 (JCH), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48873, at *8–9 n.4 (D. Conn. Apr. 9, 2014) 
(quoting Guaranty Trust to establish that federal courts need not follow state-court medi-
ation procedures mandated by state statute). 
55. In Capital Tool & Mfg Co. v. Maschinenfabrik Herkules, 837 F.2d 171, 172 (4th Cir. 1988), 
without mentioning the U.S. Supreme Court’s rulings in Guaranty Trust or Sprague, the Fourth 
Circuit held that federal courts must apply state law to determine the availability of permanent 
equitable relief (but not preliminary injunctions, see infra Section I.B) in cases arising under state 
law. See also Lord & Taylor, LLC v. White Flint, L.P., 780 F.3d 211, 215 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing 
Capital Tool, 837 F.2d at 172). In its subsequent ruling in SSMC, 102 F.3d at 708, however, the Fourth 
Circuit reaffirmed a federal court’s authority to grant equitable relief based on independent federal 
standards in diversity cases regardless of whether state law allows it, without discussing Capital Tool. 
See also Purcell v. Summers, 145 F.2d 979, 990 (4th Cir. 1944) (holding, prior to Guaranty Trust, 
that the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sprague requires federal courts to apply traditional equitable 
remedial principles, as construed by the federal courts, in diversity cases); cf. Johnson v. Collins 
Entm’t Co., 199 F.3d 710, 726–27 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding the trial court should have abstained under 
Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943), rather than exercising inherent equitable authority to 
enjoin state gambling laws).  
56. See, e.g., Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 308, 336 n.3
(1939) (declining to consider whether “the availability of [an] injunction under Rule 65 should be 
determined by the law of the forum state” or “federal equity principles” since “this argument was 
neither raised nor considered below”); Stern v. S. Chester Tube Co., 390 U.S. 606, 609–10 (1968) 
(“We need not decide whether this is a case where such a federal remedy can be provided even in the 
absence of a similar state remedy, because it is clear that state law here also provides for enforcement 
of the shareholder’s right by a compulsory judicial order.” (internal citations omitted)); cf. Russell v. 
Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 294 (1940) (declining, during the period between Erie and Guaranty Trust, to 
“consider the extent to which federal courts, in the exercise of the authority conferred upon them by 
Congress to administer equitable remedies, are bound to follow state statutes and decisions affecting 
those remedies”).  
11
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virtually every perspective, and will only briefly sketch out those 
arguments here.57 The modern Rules of Decision Act no longer 
distinguishes between actions at law and in equity,58 eliminating any 
statutory basis for treating equitable remedies (or equity in general) any 
differently from common-law issues, which state law governs in diversity 
cases. From a federalism perspective, no constitutional grants of authority 
to any branches of the federal government empower the government to 
establish a uniform body of equitable remedies for federal courts to apply 
in all cases that come before them, including those arising under state 
law.59 Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court may establish substantive 
doctrines governing the availability and calculation of damages for all 
state-law claims that happen to be heard in federal court;60 there is no 
reason the federal government’s power over equitable remedies in such 
cases would be greater. 
Likewise, from a separation-of-powers perspective, Congress has not 
enacted any laws purporting to empower courts to establish or enforce 
such a uniform body of equitable remedial principles in state-law cases.61 
Atlas Life62 and Sprague63 hold, and some commentators have argued,64 
that grants of jurisdiction to federal courts over “suits . . . in equity”65 
57. Morley, supra note 13, at 250; see also 13 MOORE, supra note 32, § 65.07[2].
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1948). As originally enacted, the Rules of Decision Act applied only to 
suits at common law. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (formerly codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 724 (1938), presently codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012)). Despite that 
limitation, the Supreme Court held that Erie applied equally to cases in equity. See Ruhlin v. N.Y. 
Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 205 (1938); see also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105–06 
(1945). A few years after Guaranty Trust, the Rules of Decision Act was amended as part of the 
codification of Title 28 to apply to “any civil action.” Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 
869, 944 (1948).  
59. Morley, supra note 13, at 267–70. 
60. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 278 (1989) (“In a diversity
action, . . . the propriety of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in question, and the factors 
the jury may consider in determining their amount, are questions of state law.”); see also Gasperini 
v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 431 (1996) (“Erie precludes a recovery in federal court
significantly larger than the recovery that would have been tolerated in state court.”); cf. Shady Grove 
Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 407–08 (2010) (holding that a rule is 
substantive for Erie purposes if it “alter[s] the rights themselves, the available remedies, or the rules 
of decision by which the court adjudicate[s] either” (emphasis added)). 
61. Morley, supra note 13, at 270–73. 
62. Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I. S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939). 
63. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat’l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164 (1939). 
64. See, e.g., Charles T. McCormick & Elvin Hale Hewins, The Collapse of “General” Law 
in the Federal Courts, 33 ILL. L. REV. 126, 139 (1938).  
65. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (granting jurisdiction over cases at law 
and in equity in which the United States was the plaintiff, an alien was a party, or the litigants were 
citizens of different states, in which the amount of controversy exceeded $500); An Act to Codify, 
Revise, and Amend the Laws Relating to the Judiciary, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091 (1911) (codified 
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implicitly authorize or require them to apply the same equitable principles 
that the English Court of Chancery did in 1789. Professor John Cross 
makes a similar argument based on Article III’s grant of the “judicial 
power” to the federal courts,66 which he maintains requires them to apply 
equitable discretion pursuant to “uniform national rules that originated in 
England and are fleshed out in federal precedent.”67 
As a general matter, jurisdiction to adjudicate a case is distinct from 
the authority to craft the law to be applied in that case.68 Under Erie, 
federal courts may not apply their own bodies of general law or federal 
common law instead of state law69 simply because they have jurisdiction 
over either “cases[] in law”70 in general, or diversity cases71 in particular. 
The same reasoning applies with equal force to cases in equity.72 
Guaranty Trust itself holds that—with the unfortunate exception of 
equitable remedial principles73—federal courts are generally required to 
follow state law in equity cases.74 
A few narrow, specialized jurisdictional grants, such as the authority 
to adjudicate disputes between states75 and admiralty cases,76 are 
interpreted as authorizing federal courts to craft and apply their own 
federal common law standards.77 Even those jurisdictional grants, 
however, do not freeze in place a particular body of law, requiring federal 
as amended at 28 U.S.C § 24(1) (1911)); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2011) (grant of jurisdiction over 
diversity cases, regardless of whether they arise at law or in equity).  
66. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
67. John Cross, The Erie Doctrine in Equity, 60 LA. L. REV. 173, 214 (1999). 
68. Tex. Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Mats. Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640–41 (1981) (“The vesting of
jurisdiction in the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to authority to formulate federal 
common law.” (citing United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973)); see 
also Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 907 (2018) (“[W]ith limited exceptions, a congressional grant 
of jurisdiction is a prerequisite to the exercise of judicial power.”).  
69. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72–73 (1938) (holding that the Rules of
Decision Act “make[s] certain that, in all matters except those in which some federal law is 
controlling, the federal courts exercising jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases would apply as 
their rules of decision the law of the State, unwritten as well as written” (emphasis added; citing 
Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 
49, 51–52, 81–88, 108 (1923)).  
70. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
71. Id., art. III, § 2, cl. 7; 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2011). 
72. See Ruhlin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202, 205 (1938). 
73. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
74. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) (“To make an exception to Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins on the equity side of a federal court is to reject the considerations of policy which, 
after long travail, led to that decision.”).  
75. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 5; 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1978). 
76. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1949). 
77. Fitzgerald v. U.S. Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963); Hinderlider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). 
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courts to apply whatever rules and doctrines existed in 1789; rather, they 
empower federal courts to develop and apply evolving federal common 
law standards.78 Thus, neither constitutional nor statutory jurisdictional 
grants should be interpreted as implicitly authorizing the equitable 
remedial rights doctrine. 
Applying a traditional unguided Erie analysis, equitable remedies 
should be deemed substantive and therefore governed by state law, rather 
than procedural and subject to federal standards. The manner in which a 
jurisdiction chooses to protect an entitlement—particularly, whether to do 
so through liability rules or property rules79—is an important policy 
choice that inherently shapes the nature of that entitlement.80 The nature 
of a right is fundamentally different depending on whether a rightholder 
may judicially insist that a specific entitlement be enforced and upheld, or 
instead must settle for a judicially determined “equivalent” amount of 
money as compensatory damages.81 Moreover, considering the “twin 
aims of the Erie rule,” disparities between federal and state courts in the 
availability of equitable remedies will induce forum shopping and lead to 
inequitable administration of the laws.82 
Other types of remedies, such as compensatory and punitive 
damages, are recognized as substantive and governed by state law.83 And 
in the context of criminal law, the Supreme Court has rejected attempts to 
distinguish sentencing factors, which the government must prove to 
trigger an enhanced sentence, from elements of the underlying criminal 
offense.84 The Court recognized that both are simply facts the government 
must prove to obtain a particular result.85 Likewise, the elements of a 
78. See Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994) (recognizing the “established 
and continuing tradition of federal common lawmaking in admiralty”); see, e.g., United States v. 
Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409–410 (1975) (“[T]he Judiciary has traditionally taken the 
lead in formulating flexible and fair remedies in the law maritime . . . There is no reason why the 
Supreme Court cannot at this late date ‘confess error’ and adopt the proportional fault doctrine without 
Congressional action.” (quotation marks omitted)).  
79. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1110 (1972) (defining and 
contrasting liability rules and property rules).  
80. Morley, supra note 13, at 265. 
81. Though exceptions exist, most forms of equitable relief tend to be “specific”, while most
forms of legal relief tend to be “substitutionary.” John M. Greabe, Constitutional Remedies and Public 
Interest Balancing, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 857, 865 (2013).  
82. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965); Morley, supra note 13, at 259–61. 
83. See supra note 60. 
84. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”).  
85. Id. at 478, 480, 492. 
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cause of action and the requirements for equitable relief are both simply 
facts the plaintiff must prove to obtain the desired outcome. They are 
equally substantive, and should be governed by the same body of law.86 
Finally, no compelling policy considerations allow federal courts to 
craft and apply an independent body of federal equitable remedial 
principles as a type of federal common law.87 The federal government 
lacks a strong interest in the availability of equitable relief for state-law 
claims. Nor is national uniformity concerning equitable relief for state-
law claims in federal court particularly necessary or desirable. Indeed, the 
sometimes substantial variations that exist among states’ causes of action 
strongly suggests that similar differences concerning the availability of 
equitable relief are acceptable. 
The strongest argument for allowing federal courts to apply their own 
uniform body of equitable remedial principles in state-law cases is that 
the federal judiciary must be able to protect itself from being forced to 
administer and enforce potentially onerous and time-intensive forms of 
equitable relief that states may authorize. Such concerns do not justify 
Guaranty Trust’s equitable remedial rights doctrine, however, for several 
reasons. First, federal courts may not modify the elements of state-created 
causes of action on the grounds they are too onerous or time-consuming 
to adjudicate. There is no basis for affording them greater latitude to 
disregard state-law requirements for equitable relief. 
Second, far more appropriate ways exist to protect federal courts 
from having to award or oversee burdensome equitable remedies. For 
example, Congress could strip federal courts of jurisdiction to hear state-
law claims in which unduly burdensome forms of equitable relief are 
sought88 or, perhaps, federal courts could simply abstain from hearing 
them.89 Exercising jurisdiction over a case while changing the outcome 
that state law dictates on institutional convenience grounds is the worst 
combination of responses. Purporting to enforce state-created rights 
divorced from the remedies the state creates for them undermines state 
policy. Scholars such as Professor Marin K. Levy express strong 
reservations about courts promoting their institutional self-interest at the 
86. Morley, supra note 13, at 266–67. 
87. Id. at 274.
88. Cf. Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 329-30 (1938) (enforcing special
jurisdictional limitations that  Congress imposed on the federal judiciary’s power to issue injunctions 
for causes of action relating to labor disputes, including claims arising under state law). 
89. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 717 (1996) (“[A] federal court has the 
authority to decline to exercise its jurisdiction when it ‘is asked to employ its historic powers as a 
court of equity.’” (quoting Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 120 
(1981) (Brennan, J., concurring))).   
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expense of litigants’ rights by limiting the availability of equitable relief 
those litigants would otherwise receive.90 
Finally, concerns about the federal judiciary’s institutional capacity 
could be addressed by implementing a far less extreme escape valve. 
Federal courts could be required to apply state law when deciding whether 
to award equitable relief for state-law claims, unless awarding a particular 
type of relief authorized or mandated by state law would impose a severe 
and unusual strain on federal judicial resources. There is little reason to 
believe that federal courts would have to invoke such an escape valve very 
often. Applying state equitable remedial principles across the great run of 
cases in which they do not threaten the federal judiciary’s institutional 
resources is far more consistent with Erie than categorically applying a 
uniform body of federal equitable remedial principles to all cases arising 
under state law. 
The first edition of Hart & Weschler’s treatise The Federal Courts 
and the Federal System raised the possibility that federal courts should 
apply their own body of equitable remedial principles in diversity cases to 
“giv[e] a fuller and fairer remedy in the enforcement of state-created rights 
and obligations,” which the treatise suggested would constitute a “kind of 
juster justice.”91 Whether particular remedies are adequate, just, or 
sufficiently fair, however, are exactly the kinds of substantive policy-
related questions that Erie leaves to the states. State law is a vector; it 
establishes both the direction and magnitude of a particular policy.92 
Changing the nature of the protection the state affords a right may over- 
or under-enforce that right in ways that undermine the state’s substantive 
policy decisions93 or the compromises that allowed recognition of the 
right.94 
90. See Marin K. Levy, Consequentialist Courts (work in progress) (manuscript on file with
author); cf. Thermtron Prods. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 344 (1976) (“[A]n otherwise properly 
removed action may no more be remanded because the district court considers itself too busy to try it 
than an action properly filed in the federal court in the first instance may be dismissed or referred to 
state courts for such reason.”).  
91. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 652 (1st ed. 1953).  
92. See Frank Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 63 (1988) (“Law is like a vector. It has length as well as direction. . . . To find 
length we must take account of objectives, of means chosen, and of stopping places identified.”).  
93. Cf. Daryl Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
857, 887 (1999); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 79, at 1110 (recognizing that a lawmaker must 
decide both which competing claimant should receive an entitlement and the manner in which that 
entitlement shall be protected).  
94. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1441, 1449 (2008) (examining the role of compromise in legislation).  
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Professor Henry Smith has characterized equity as a “second-order” 
system that modifies outcomes dictated by the common law to achieve 
more desirable results.95 Building on this theory, Jeffrey Steven Gordon 
contends that equity cannot function effectively as a second-order system 
if federal courts must apply state-law standards for awarding equitable 
relief in cases arising under state law.96 A complete analysis of the extent 
to which modern equity continues to function as a second-order system is 
beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, my proposal does not 
preclude federal courts from imposing second-order interventions in state-
law cases. When federal courts sitting in diversity exercise their equitable 
discretion pursuant to state-court precedents, equity plays as much a 
second-order function as it would in state court. Federal courts may apply 
equity as a second-order system just as well by implementing a state’s 
conception of equity as with an independent body of uniform federal 
equitable principles. 
Thus, properly understood, Erie should dispel the notion that federal 
courts are obligated to apply a uniform body of equitable principles to all 
cases that come before them. Equitable relief for state-law claims, like 
state-law causes of action themselves, should be governed by state law. 
Guaranty Trust’s equitable remedial rights doctrine should be discarded. 
95. Henry Smith, Fusing the Equitable Function in Private Law, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 173, 175–76 (Kit Barker et al. eds., 2017).  
96. Jeffrey Steven Gordon, Our Equity: Federalism and Chancery, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 176, 
226–27 (2017).  
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B. The Special Case of Preliminary Injunctions 
Nearly every circuit to consider the issue,97 as well as some 
commentators,98 have concluded that federal courts must apply traditional 
equitable principles as interpreted by the federal judiciary when ruling on 
requests for preliminary injunctions in diversity cases. These rulings 
generally do not rely on Guaranty Trust or the equitable remedial rights 
doctrine, however.99 Rather, most circuits have declared preliminary 
injunctions to be a procedural mechanism governed by Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 65100 and subject to federal standards under the Erie 
doctrine.101 
Some jurisdictions have reached the unusual compromise conclusion 
that, although federal law governs the elements for preliminary 
injunctions, federal courts must apply the state-law definitions of each 
element.102 The Third Circuit instead applies traditional federal standards 
to motions for preliminary injunctions but, for the likelihood-of-success-
on-the-merits prong, requires the movant to show it will likely qualify for 
a permanent injunction under state law at the end of the case.103 This 
approach effectively requires movants to satisfy both federal and state 
97. Most of these cases involved claims for equitable relief in causes of action arising under
state common law. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Giles, 47 F.3d 467, 470 (1st Cir. 1995); Baker’s Aid v. 
Hussmann Foodservice Co., 830 F.2d 13, 15 (2d Cir. 1987); Sys. Ops., Inc. v. Sci. Games Dev. Corp., 
555 F.2d 1131, 1141 (3d Cir. 1977); Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 
811 (4th Cir. 1991); Cert. Restor. Dry Cleaning Net., L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 541 (6th 
Cir. 2007); Healthcare Mgmt. & Inv. Holdings, L.L.C. v. Feldman, No. 03-4140, 2004 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 28854, at *2–3 (6th Cir. Apr. 8, 2004); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Am. Wholesale Co., 235 F.2d 606, 
608 (7th Cir. 1956); Safety-Kleen Sys. v. Hennkens, 301 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir. 2002); Flood v. 
ClearOne Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 1110, 1117 (10th Cir. 2010); Equifax Serv., Inc. v. Hitz, 905 
F.2d 1355, 1361 (10th Cir. 1990); Ferrero v. Assoc. Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1148 (11th Cir. 
1991). Some, however, involved requests for preliminary injunctions under state statutes. See Capital 
Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Maschinenfabrik Herkules, 837 F.2d 171, 172 (4th Cir. 1988); S. Milk Sales, Inc. 
v. Martin, 924 F.2d 98, 101-02 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Star Fuel Marts, LLC v. Sam’s E., Inc., 362
F.3d 639, 651–52, 652 n.5 (10th Cir. 2004).  
98. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 32, §§ 2943, 4513; David E. Shipley, The Preliminary 
Injunction Standard in Diversity: A Typical Unguided Erie Choice, 50 GA. L. REV. 1169, 1217–18 
(2016); Gordon, supra note 96, at 180.  
99. See infra note 106 and accompanying text. Indeed, a few circuits expressly distinguish
between preliminary and permanent injunctions in diversity cases, applying federal law to the former 
and, notwithstanding Guaranty Trust, state law to the latter. See, e.g., Capital Tool & Mfg. Co., 837 
F.2d at 172–73 (4th Cir. 1988).  
100.  FED. R. CIV. P. 65. 
101.  See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).  
102.  See, e.g., Heil Trailer Int’l Co. v. Kula, 542 F. App’x 329, 335 (5th Cir. 2013); JAK Prods., 
Inc. v. Wiza, 986 F.2d 1080, 1084 (7th Cir. 1993); Safety-Kleens, 301 F.3d at 935.  
103.  Sys. Ops., Inc. v. Sci. Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1141, 1143 (3d Cir. 1977).  
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standards. Only the Ninth Circuit104 and a few stray opinions from other 
circuits that do not appear to reflect those jurisdictions’ dominant 
positions on the issue105 apply exclusively state-law standards for 
preliminary injunctions on state-law claims. 
Wright & Miller’s treatise, which many circuits cite on this point,106 
explains the prevailing approach.107 It contends that Rule 65108 “may be 
read as a codification of the traditional federal equity practice.”109 
Pursuant to Hanna v. Plumer,110 such a rule trumps contrary state laws 
and policies.111 The treatise also argues that applying uniform federal 
standards to requests for preliminary injunctions for state-law claims 
“would not impair state interests in any substantial way.”112 
Notwithstanding this widespread consensus, preliminary injunctions 
for state-law claims in federal court should be governed by the same body 
of law—state law—as permanent injunctions, for several reasons.113 First, 
104.  Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1988).  
 105.  See, e.g., Outsource Int’l, Inc. v. Barton & Barton Staffing Sols., 192 F.3d 662, 666 (7th 
Cir. 1999); Bogosian v. Woloohojian Realty Corp., 923 F.2d 898, 904 (1st Cir. 1991); Franke v. 
Wiltschek, 209 F.2d 493, 497 (2d Cir. 1953) (applying both state choice-of-law principles and state 
law to determine whether to issue a preliminary injunction in a trade secrets case arising under state 
law). Moore’s treatise has recognized the split on the issue. 17A MOORE, supra note 32, § 124.05.  
106.  Sys. Ops., Inc., 555 F.2d at 1141; Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 
802, 811 (4th Cir. 1991); Capital Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Maschinenfabrik Herkules, 837 F.2d 171, 172 
(4th Cir. 1988); Equifax Serv., Inc. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355, 1361 (10th Cir. 1990); Ferrero v. Assoc. 
Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1991). Even some courts that do not cite Wright & 
Miller’s treatise have adopted the same analysis. See, e.g., S. Milk Sales v. Martin, 924 F.2d 98, 101–
02 (6th Cir. 1991). Many other courts simply rely on these precedents without independently 
analyzing the issue. Baker’s Aid v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 830 F.2d 13, 15 (2d Cir. 1987); Heil 
Trailer Int’l, 542 F. App’x at 335 & n.22–23; Healthcare Mgmt. & Inv. Holdings, L.L.C. v. Feldman, 
No. 03-4140, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 28854, at *2–3 (6th Cir. Apr. 8, 2004); Star Fuel Marts, LLC v. 
Sam’s E., Inc., 362 F.3d 639, 651–52, 652 n.5 (10th Cir. 2004). 
107.  WRIGHT, supra note 32, §§ 2943, 4513.  
108.  FED. R. CIV. P. 65.  
109.  WRIGHT, supra note 32, § 2943.  
110.  380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).  
111.  WRIGHT, supra note 32, §§ 2943, 4513.  
112.  Id. § 2943. 
113.  In the horizontal choice-of-law context involving competing states’ laws, courts often hold 
that the law of the forum state governs the availability of preliminary injunctions since it is a 
procedural issue. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 130 & cmt. a; see, e.g., 
Apache Vill., Inc. v. Coleman Co., 776 P.2d 1154, 1155 (Colo. App. 1989); Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC 
v. McMahon, No. 13-C-05-61604, 2005 Md. Cir. Ct. LEXIS 11, at *10-11 (Md. Cir. Ct. Aug. 19,
2005). I believe this approach is also misguided; the body of equitable principles governing the 
availability of injunctive relief, whether interim or permanent, arises from the law creating the 
underlying cause of action. See generally Morley, supra note 13. Nevertheless, my arguments here 
do not necessarily require any change in doctrine concerning horizontal choice-of-law. Guaranty 
Trust, 326 U.S. at 108–09, emphasizes that whether a concept is deemed “substantive” or 
“procedural” under the Erie doctrine is independent of its characterization in other contexts, including 
horizontal choice-of-law. Thus, preliminary injunctions may be deemed substantive for Erie purposes 
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as I have argued elsewhere,114 Wright & Miller’s analysis is based on a 
misreading of Rule 65. That rule does not provide substantive standards 
for courts to apply in deciding whether to grant any form of injunctive 
relief, except for the requirement that a litigant seeking an ex parte 
temporary restraining order demonstrate that waiting for the other side to 
be heard would cause “irreparable injury, loss, or damage.”115 When the 
Supreme Court identified the requirements for preliminary injunctions in 
Winter v. NRDC116 (as well as for permanent injunctions in eBay Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C.117), it traced them to traditional equitable 
principles without mentioning Rule 65. 
Shortly after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted, 
Armistead M. Dobie, a member of the Advisory Committee on Rules of 
Civil Procedure that drafted them, explained the Committee’s handiwork 
in a Virginia Law Review article entitled The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.118 With regard to injunctions, he stated that the issue was “so 
loaded with potential dynamite that the committee played quite safe and 
made very few changes in the existing practice.”119 He further explained, 
“Rule 65 affects only the procedural aspects of injunctions, not 
jurisdiction and not the propriety of issuing them.”120 The advisory 
committee notes accompanying the rule do not specifically address the 
issue. Thus, Rule 65 neither establishes the standards governing 
preliminary injunctions nor requires federal courts to apply a uniform 
body of federal equitable principles when adjudicating requests for 
preliminary injunctions in cases arising under state law. 
The treatise also errs in concluding that the application of federal 
standards would not impair state interests.121 As discussed earlier, a state 
has the same interest in determining the nature of the entitlements it 
creates and how those entitlements will be protected as it does in 
determining whether to create them in the first place.122 If state law allows 
a court to immediately enjoin certain harmful acts, the state has an interest 
in having that standard apply, rather than an alternate body of law that 
yet procedural for choice-of-law purposes. Indeed, that is exactly how Guaranty Trust treated state 
statutes of limitations for equitable claims arising under state law. Id. at 109–10.  
 114.  Morley, supra note 13, at 252–55; see also Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643, 
646 (9th Cir. 1988). 
115.  FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(1)(A).  
116.  555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).  
117.  547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).  
118.  Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261 (1938).  
119.  Id. at 301.  
120.  Id. at 302 n.182 (emphasis added). 
121.  WRIGHT, supra note 32, § 2943. 
122.  See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.  
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may allow such acts to occur while a case is being litigated. Likewise, if 
a particular showing is insufficient under state law to warrant injunctive 
relief, the state has an interest in allowing the underlying conduct to 
continue without being blocked by a federal injunction. 
Second, state law should govern preliminary injunctions because 
they are a substantive remedy, not a procedural tool. Preliminary 
injunctions regulate (or, if not issued, fail to regulate) litigants’ primary 
conduct outside of court and do not directly govern the court’s fact-
finding process. Accordingly, they do not “concern[] merely the manner 
and the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by the State, is 
enforced.”123 Unlike injunctions under the All Writs Act, which are issued 
to protect a federal court’s jurisdiction,124 preliminary injunctions protect 
a party’s legally cognizable interests—which are a function of state law—
while a case is pending. They directly implicate questions of substantive 
law, including whether a defendant is permitted to engage in certain 
actions, the showing that is necessary to prevent the defendant from taking 
those actions, and a plaintiff’s entitlement to be free of certain harms. This 
is equally true whether the restrictions on the defendant are temporary or 
permanent. 
Third, applying different bodies of law to determine the availability 
of interim and permanent injunctive relief125 could lead to contradictory 
results. Awarding a preliminary injunction under federal equitable 
principles in cases where state standards bar such relief at the end of trial 
forestalls harms against which state law does not actually protect—and 
that will occur following trial even if the plaintiff prevails. Conversely, if 
federal standards prohibit a preliminary injunction when state law would 
authorize a permanent injunction following trial, then the court would be 
permitting irreparable harm that state law seeks to avoid. Thus, applying 
substantially different standards could lead to irrational and internally 
inconsistent results at odds with the litigants’ rights under state law. The 
need for consistency between the standards for preliminary and permanent 
injunctions is likely one reason why the Supreme Court has recognized 
that the requirements for both types of relief under federal law are 
virtually identical, except a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of 
 123.  Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945); see also Shipley, supra note 98, at 
1210–11.  
124.  28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1949).  
 125.  Some courts have contemplated the possibility of applying federal standards to preliminary 
injunctions and state standards to permanent injunctions. See, e.g., Sensormatic Elec. Corp. v. Tag 
Co. U.S., LLC, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1181–82, 1187, 1192–93 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Dunkin’ Donuts 
Inc. v. N.A.S.T., Inc., 428 F. Supp. 2d 761, 775 (N.D. Ill. 2005).  
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success on the merits to obtain a preliminary injunction and actual success 
on the merits for a permanent injunction.126 As the Court itself has 
recognized, “[T]he burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track the 
burdens at trial.”127 
Fourth, the “twin aims of Erie” are served as much by applying state-
law standards to preliminary injunctions as to permanent injunctions.128 
Differences among courts in the likelihood or difficulty of obtaining a 
preliminary injunction are likely to drive forum shopping.129 And 
allowing a defendant’s ability to engage in particular conduct while a case 
is pending to vary based on the forum is a paradigmatic example of 
“inequitable administration of the laws.”130 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit has held that a federal court’s decision as 
to whether to issue a preliminary injunction should be treated as part of a 
case’s outcome.131 Such rulings determine whether a defendant may 
“accomplish[] what [state law] has prohibited,” even if for only a limited 
period of time.132 Thus, state law should govern preliminary injunctions 
for state-law claims. 
Professor David E. Shipley, defending the prevailing consensus, 
contends that applying federal law to preliminary injunctions for state-law 
claims best serves the “twin aims of Erie” because litigants are unlikely 
to base their choice of forum on the standards governing interim relief.133 
He argues that other factors, such as “differences in jury selection 
practices, differences in discovery, differences in docket management, 
and perceptions about appointed judges instead of elected judges” are far 
more important considerations in deciding where to file, or whether to 
remove, a case.134 Given the frequent importance of immediate injunctive 
relief, however, differences in standards governing preliminary 
injunctions are likely to be a major factor—outweighing most of the other 
considerations Shipley identifies—in many cases. 
Shipley also asserts that differences in preliminary injunction 
standards do not affect a case’s outcome because, by definition, they 
 126.  Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987) (“The standard for a 
preliminary injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with the exception that 
the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual success.”); accord 
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008).  
127.  Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 429 (2006).  
128.  Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).  
129.  Id.  
130.  Id.  
131.  Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1988).  
132.  Id.  
133.  Shipley, supra note 98, at 1217–18.  
134.  Id. at 1217.  
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pertain only to interim relief.135 But even if limited in duration, the grant 
or denial of an order allowing, mandating, or prohibiting a defendant from 
engaging in certain activity affects the primary legal relations between the 
plaintiff and defendant. Such determinations—whether the defendant was 
permitted to engage in certain conduct for a particular period—are 
properly considered part of a case’s outcome. 
He further points out that federal and state standards for preliminary 
injunctions will often lead to the same conclusion.136 That possibility is 
sometimes overstated137 and, in any event, does not resolve the issue of 
what federal courts should do when the standards materially diverge. 
Finally, Shipley contends that imposing different standards for 
preliminary injunctions in state and federal court “do[es] not raise the kind 
of litigant inequality issues that concerned the Supreme Court in Erie and 
its progeny.”138 Yet the availability of injunctive relief affects the nature 
of a plaintiff’s rights—determining whether the plaintiff can demand 
specific entitlements and attempt to prevent violations ex ante, or instead 
must settle for ex post compensation. 
Jeffrey Steven Gordon contends that federal standards govern 
“equitable relief which merely facilitates or aids a final merits decision,” 
such as a preliminary injunction, unless the relief “is functionally 
equivalent to a final decision.”139 Federal law “presumptively governs 
preliminary injunctions,” Gordon argues, “because they merely seek to 
minimize the risk of irreparable injury pending litigation on the merits.”140 
A party’s right to avoid irreparable injury—and even which harms are 
deemed irreparable—however, are substantive matters that should be 
governed by state law. 
The fact that a lawsuit has been filed does not empower a federal 
court to prohibit the primary substantive conduct at issue in the case if 
state law would allow it to occur (albeit subject to ex post compensatory 
damages), or to permit such conduct when state law would enjoin it. 
Moreover, the facilitative power of which Gordon speaks was primarily a 
function of having separate courts of law and equity with different 
procedures staffed by different judges. In our post-merger world, in which 
135.  Id. at 1218.  
136.  Id. at 1219.  
137.  See infra Part II.  
138.  Shipley, supra note 98, at 1221.  
139.  Gordon, supra note 96, at 180; see also id. at 260 (arguing that federal courts may grant 
equitable relief pursuant to independent federal standards if it “is preliminary or auxiliary to, or merely 
facilitates the determination of . . . state-created right[s]”).  
 140.  Id. at 180. He also echoes Shipley’s argument that preliminary injunctions are not outcome-
determinative. Id. at 262.  
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federal cases at law and in equity are both governed by the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, there is no need for an ancillary body of facilitative 
law to govern the relationship between competing judicial systems. Thus, 
when federal courts adjudicate claims arising under state law, they should 
apply the law of that state in determining whether to grant either 
preliminary or permanent injunctions. 
II. COMPARING FEDERAL AND STATE
STANDARDS FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF 
Many federal courts avoid determining whether to apply federal or 
state law to requests for injunctions for state-law claims by declaring that 
both sets of standards are identical.141 Such courts typically go on to apply 
federal standards and caselaw. 
The fact that the elements of federal and state standards for injunctive 
relief are often comparable does not mean those standards are identical 
and interchangeable, due to both facial disparities and precedential 
disparities. Facial disparities concern the formal articulation of the 
standards themselves. In many cases where federal and state standards 
facially appear to incorporate the same elements, important differences 
often nevertheless exist, including the precise phrasing of the elements 
and the way in which they relate to each other. 
Even when federal and state standards are facially identical in every 
respect, however, precedential disparities unavoidably exist. Each of the 
elements comprising a legal standard established by a particular 
jurisdiction is not a freestanding self-defined concept, but rather a proxy 
for that jurisdiction’s body of precedent construing it. Identical federal 
and state elements are proxies for completely different bodies of caselaw 
interpreting them. Many states have interpreted and applied concepts such 
as irreparable injury and inadequate remedy at law differently than 
federal courts in several respects. Even when federal and state holdings 
do not expressly or directly conflict, different bodies of precedent 
inherently provide different guideposts and points of comparison for 
 141.  See, e.g., Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. Pepsico, Inc., 160 F.3d 58, 61 (1st Cir. 1998); 
Fed. Leasing, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 650 F.2d 495, 499 n.4 (4th Cir. 1981); Travelers Cas. 
& Sur. Co. of Am. v. W.P. Rowland Constructors Corp., No. CV-12-00390-PHX-FJM, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 68147, at *5–6 (D. Ariz. May 15, 2012); In re Light Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices 
Litig., 751 F. Supp. 2d 183, 190 n.9 (D. Me. 2010); U.S. Cable Television Grp., L.P. v. Osage City, 
No. 91-4195-R, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14148, at *6 (D. Kan. Sept. 5, 1991); Fashion Two Twenty, 
Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836, 849 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); cf. Friends for All Children, Inc. v. 
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 828 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (avoiding choosing between D.C. 
law and traditional equitable principles as construed by the federal judiciary by predicting that the 
District of Columbia would adopt and follow those principles).  
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resolving future disputes. Thus, federal courts should engage in an Erie 
analysis to determine whether federal or state law governs injunctive 
relief, even when the competing sets of standards appear comparable or 
identical, to ensure they apply the correct body of precedent. 
A. Facial Disparities 
Although federal and state standards for injunctive relief often 
appear to involve the same elements, the standards frequently differ from 
each other in subtle, yet important ways. In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., the U.S. Supreme Court held that, to obtain a permanent injunction 
under the traditional equitable principles that federal courts apply, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate: 
(1)  that it has suffered an irreparable injury; 
(2)  that remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for 
that injury; 
(3)  that considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff 
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and 
(4)  that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent 
injunction.142 
Winter v. NRDC adopted similar factors for preliminary injunctions, 
requiring a plaintiff to show: 
(1)  that he is likely to succeed on the merits, 
(2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief, 
(3)  that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and 
(4)  that an injunction is in the public interest.143 
Some states have comparable frameworks144 while others’ 
substantially differ.145 Several omit references to equitable balancing, 
142.  547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).  
 143.  555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 
n.12 (1987).  
144.  See, e.g., Okla. Pub. Emps. Ass’n v. Okla. Military Dep’t, 330 P.3d 497, 509 (Okla. 2014); 
Wayne Cty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Corti, 954 A.2d 319, 329 & n.16 (Del. Ch. 2008) (quoting In re 
Checkfree Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 3193, 2007 Del. Ch. LEXIS 148 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2007)); His 
Way, Inc. v. McMillin, 909 So. 2d 738, 744 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005); Van Loan v. Van Loan, 895 P.2d 
614, 617 (Mont. 1995).  
 145.  See, e.g., City of Baton Rouge/Par. of E. Baton Rouge v. 200 Gov’t St., LLC, 995 So. 2d 
32, 35 (La. Ct. App. 2008). Some jurisdictions combine or separate elements in various ways that do 
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declining to take into account either balance-of-hardship or public interest 
considerations.146 The South Carolina Supreme Court, for example, has 
stated, “[T]he ‘balancing the equities’ requirement is neither necessary 
nor appropriate in a preliminary injunction case.”147 Other states echo the 
first three elements of the federal tests while omitting the public interest 
as a separate consideration.148 
In addition to the factors identified in these federal tests, several 
states require that the plaintiff’s rights be “certain and clearly 
ascertainable,”149 an additional constraint some plaintiffs may be unable 
to satisfy. Maine instead requires a heightened showing of likelihood of 
success on the merits when a plaintiff seeks a mandatory, as opposed to 
prohibitory, preliminary injunction.150 
While some states apply their usual standards for injunctive relief 
when a statute or ordinance authorizes an injunction as a remedy,151 others 
not appear to substantively affect the federal standard. See, e.g., Langlois v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of 
El Paso, 78 P.3d 1154, 1157-58 (Colo. App. 2003); Life of the Land v. Ariyoshi, 577 P.2d 1116, 1118 
n.2 (Haw. 1978).  
 146.  See, e.g., Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); Messerli v. Dep’t 
of Nat’l Res., 768 P.2d 1112, 1122 (Alaska 1989); Thompson v. Planning Comm’n of Jacksonville, 
464 So. 2d 1231, 1236 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Wash. Fed’n of State Emps. v. State, 665 P.2d 
1337, 1343-44 (Wash. 1983); Zebra v. Sch. Dist., 296 A.2d 748, 750 (Pa. 1972); see also AFSCME 
v. City of Detroit, 652 N.W.2d 240, 250 n.5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
147.  Poynter Invs. v. Cent. Builders of Piedmont, 694 S.E.2d 15, 17 (S.C. 2010); see Denman 
v. City of Columbia, 691 S.E.2d 465, 470 (S.C. 2010); see also Shaw v. Tampa Elec. Co., 949 So. 2d 
1066, 1069 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (omitting the balance-of-hardships analysis). 
 148.  See, e.g., Alsworth v. Seybert, 323 P.3d 47, 54 (Alaska 2014); City of Duluth v. 
Riverbrooke Props., Inc., 502 S.E.2d 806, 814 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); SI Mgmt. L.P. v. Wininger, 707 
A.2d 37, 40 (Del. 1998); Planned Parenthood of Mid-Iowa v. Maki, 478 N.W.2d 637, 639 (Iowa 
1991); Bank of New England, N.A. v. Mortgage Corp. of New England, 567 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1991) (“Massachusetts law differs from Federal law in that the public interest is not 
ordinarily considered in determining whether to grant a preliminary injunction.”); Shearson Lehman 
Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. Schmertzler, 500 N.Y.S.2d 512, 513 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); Rustic Hills 
Shopping Plaza, Inc. v. Columbia Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 661 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo. 1983).  
 149.  Lee/O’Keefe Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Ferega, 516 N.E.2d 1313, 1317 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); see 
also Gulf Power Co. v. Glass, 355 So. 2d 147, 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (“A mandatory injunction 
is proper where a clear legal right is at stake . . . .”); Platinum Coast Fin. Corp. v. Farino’s, Inc., 662 
So. 2d 724, 724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Wash. Fed’n of State Emps. v. State, 665 P.2d 1337, 1343 
(Wash. 1983); Zebra v. Sch. Dist., 296 A.2d 748, 750 (Pa. 1972).  
150.  Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Emerson, 563 A.2d 762, 768 (Me. 1989).  
 151.  See, e.g., P&G v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268, 274 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (“When a statute 
merely provides that a party is entitled to injunctive relief as well as other types of relief . . . the party 
requesting the injunction must use the general equitable principles governing the issuance of 
injunctive relief.”); Bally Mfg. Corp. v. JS&A Grp., Inc., 410 N.E.2d 321, 326 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) 
(“The customary standards governing the issuance of preliminary injunctions should continue to be 
followed in determining whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief pursuant to section 3 of the 
[Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act].”); see also East Providence v. R.I. Hosp. Tr. Nat’l Bank, 
505 A.2d 1143, 1145–46 (R.I. 1986) (holding that a statute authorizing courts to grant injunctions 
against zoning violations neither “mandate[s] issuance of such relief” nor was “intended . . . to divest 
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have adopted special rules for such statutory injunctions. Many state 
courts either automatically issue injunctions to government entities when 
a defendant has violated a state law or local ordinance that authorizes 
injunctive relief,152 or waive certain elements for government plaintiffs.153 
Some jurisdictions excuse both private and public plaintiffs from 
demonstrating irreparable injury154 or lack of an adequate remedy at 
law155 when seeking statutory injunctions, or even waive the traditional 
equitable factors completely.156 
the courts of their authority to determine the appropriateness of, and to formulate, equitable relief”); 
State ex rel. Cox v. Davidson Indus., Inc., 635 P.2d 630, 637 (Or. 1981); Shapleigh v. Shikles, 427 
A.2d 460, 464–65 (Me. 1981); Salt Lake Cty. v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136, 138–39 (Utah 1976); cf. 
Worthington v. Kenkel, 684 N.W.2d 228, 233–34 (Iowa 2004) (assessing “the design of the statute” 
to determine whether the legislature intended to dispense with traditional equitable principles and 
require automatic issuance of injunctions when the statute was violated).  
 152.  State ex rel. Office of the Att’y Gen. v. NOS Commc’ns, Inc., 84 P.3d 1052, 1053-55 (Nev. 
2004) (per curiam) (“To obtain injunctive relief in a statutory enforcement action, a state or 
government agency need only show, through competent evidence, a reasonable likelihood that the 
statute was violated and that the statute specifically allows injunctive relief.”); Midland Enters., Inc. 
v. City of Elmhurst, 624 N.E.2d 913, 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (“The general rule that a statutory claim 
need not satisfy the traditional principles of equity is based upon the presumption that public harm 
occurs when the statute is violated.”); State v. Tex. Pet Foods, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 800, 805 (Tex. 1979); 
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. State Dep’t of Health Air Pollution Variance Bd., 553 P.2d 800, 808 
(Colo. 1976); State by Heltzel v. O.K. Transfer Co., 330 P.2d 510, 513 (Or. 1958) (holding that, when 
a statute authorizing injunctive relief has been violated, “[i]t is enough if the statutory conditions are 
made to appear”).  
 153.  See, e.g., Forest Cnty. v. Goode, 579 N.W.2d 715, 728 (Wis. 1998) (eliminating irreparable 
injury requirement for government entities seeking injunctions against violations of zoning 
ordinances); City of Snyder v. Cogdell, 342 S.W.2d 201, 202-03 (Tex. App. 1960) (same); Ackerman 
v. Tri-City Geriatric & Health Care, Inc., 378 N.E.2d 145, 148-49 (Ohio 1978) (“[W]here an
injunction is authorized by a statute designed to provide a governmental agent with the means to 
enforce public policy, no balancing of equities is necessary.” (quotation marks omitted)).  
 154.  See, e.g., Jurisch v. Jenkins, 749 So. 2d 597, 599 (La. 1999) (“A petitioner is entitled to 
injunctive relief without the requisite showing of irreparable injury when the conduct sought to be 
restrained is unconstitutional or unlawful, i.e., when the conduct sought to be enjoined constitutes a 
direct violation of a prohibitory law and/or a violation of a constitutional right.”); Thompson v. Smith, 
129 A.2d 638, 651-52 (Vt. 1957) (eliminating irreparable injury requirement for plaintiffs seeking 
injunctions against violations of zoning ordinances). 
 155.  Conservation Comm’n v. Price, 479 A.2d 187, 196 (Conn. 1984) (“[T]he enactment of the 
statute by implication assumes that no adequate alternative remedy exists and that the injury was 
irreparable, that is, the legislation was needed or else it would not have been enacted.” (quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 156.  Edwards v. Emperor’s Garden Rest., 130 P.3d 1280, 1285 (Nev. 2006) (holding that the 
trial court “improperly looked to traditional equitable grounds in considering a statutory injunction 
request”); Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, 795 So. 2d 191, 206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (“If 
injunctive relief is the specified, primary remedy to correct a violation of a public duty and to vindicate 
the right of a person affected by the violation of that duty, it can properly be deemed a rule that the 
Legislature has created, not a grant of discretion.”); Va. Beach S.P.C.A., Inc. v. S. Hampton Rds. 
Veterinary Ass’n. 329 S.E. 2d 10, 13 (Va. 1985). (“When a statute empowers a court to grant 
injunctive relief, the party seeking an injunction is not required to establish the traditional 
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Some injunctions granted by state courts are based on completely 
different elements from the traditional equitable principles identified by 
the U.S. Supreme Court. New York courts, for example, recognize 
Yellowstone injunctions.157 A Yellowstone injunction stays the deadline 
specified in a commercial lease for the tenant to cure an alleged breach 
while the tenant seeks a final judgment as to whether a breach actually 
exists.158 A tenant may obtain a Yellowstone injunction in New York state 
court by showing that it holds a commercial lease, received a notice of 
default or threat of termination from the landlord, sought the injunction 
prior to termination, and “is prepared and maintains the ability to cure the 
alleged default by any means short of vacating the premises.”159 Tenants 
seeking Yellowstone injunctions are not required to satisfy the traditional 
requirements for injunctive relief, including irreparable injury or even 
likelihood of success on the merits.160 New York federal courts will not 
grant such relief, however, unless the plaintiff satisfies federal 
standards.161 
Even states that have adopted the same basic frameworks for 
injunctive relief as the federal courts often articulate some of the factors 
differently. For example, federal standards require a plaintiff to show that 
a preliminary injunction would affirmatively be “in the public interest,”162 
while many states require the plaintiff instead to show only that the 
“public interest will not be adversely affected by granting the 
injunction.”163 Likewise, while Winter requires a plaintiff to demonstrate 
that it “is likely to succeed on the merits,”164 many states require only a 
prerequisites . . . before the injunction can issue.”); Little Joseph Realty, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 
363 N.E. 2d 1163, 1168 (N.Y. 1977) (holding that zoning violations must be “enjoined 
unconditionally”); 
 157.  First Nat’l Stores, Inc. v. Yellowstone Shopping Ctr., Inc., 237 N.E.2d 868, 870-71 (N.Y. 
1968); see also TAG 380, LLC v. ComMet 380, Inc., 890 N.E.2d 195, 198 (N.Y. 2008).  
158.  Post v. 120 E. End Ave Corp., 464 N.E.2d 125, 127 (N.Y. 1984).  
 159.  Lexington Ave. & 42nd St. Corp. v. 380 Lexchamp Operating, Inc., 613 N.Y.S.2d 402, 
404 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); see also Jemaltown of 125th St., Inc. v. Leon Betsch/Park Seen Realty 
Assocs., 496 N.Y.S.2d 16, 16-18 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).  
160.  Post, 464 N.E.2d at 127; see also Jemaltown, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 17-18 (overturning trial 
court ruling because it applied the traditional standards for injunctive relief, rather than the elements 
for a Yellowstone injunction).  
 161.  Children’s Place Retail Stores, Inc. v. Pyramid Co., No. 97-CV-1047 (FJS) (GLS), 1998 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23599, at *5-8 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1998).  
162.  Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).  
 163.  Ingraham v. Univ. of Me., 441 A.2d 691, 693 (Me. 1982) (per curiam); see also Harvest 
Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co., 492 N.E.2d 686, 688 (Ind. 1986). 
164.  555 U.S. at 20 (emphasis added).  
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reasonable likelihood165 or reasonable probability166 of success. Some are 
even more forgiving, requiring only that the plaintiff “raise ‘serious’ and 
substantial questions going to the merits of the case.”167 Maine requires a 
plaintiff to “exhibit[] a likelihood of success on the merits (at most, a 
probability; at least, a substantial possibility).”168 
Similarly, federal courts require the plaintiff to show “that he is likely 
to suffer irreparable harm.”169 Winter held that the lower court had erred 
by granting a preliminary injunction “based only on a ‘possibility’ of 
irreparable harm.”170 The Supreme Court explained that this “‘possibility’ 
standard is too lenient.”171 It emphasized, “Issuing a preliminary 
injunction based on the possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with 
our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that 
may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to 
such relief.”172 
In some states, in contrast, “the possibility of irreparable injury” is 
sufficient to warrant injunctive relief.173 The Arizona Court of Appeals, 
for example, has held that while Winter “requires the party seeking an 
injunction to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely,” Arizona law 
requires only that the injury be “merely possible.”174 Other states, rather 
than inquiring into irreparable harm at all, require only injury that is 
“actual and substantial.”175 Still others, in contrast, have arguably higher 
 165.  Lee/O’Keefe Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Ferega, 516 N.E.2d 1313, 1317 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); 
accord Harvest Ins. Agency, 492 N.E.2d at 688.  
 166.  SI Mgmt. L.P. v. Wininger, 707 A.2d 37, 40 (Del. 1998); accord Rustic Hills Shopping 
Plaza, Inc. v. Columbia Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 661 P.2d 254, 256 (Colo. 1983).  
 167.  Messerli v. Dep’t of Nat’l Res., 768 P.2d 1112, 1122 (Alaska 1989). Some federal circuits, 
notwithstanding Winter, apply this approach for preliminary injunctions. See, e.g., Alliance for the 
Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he ‘serious questions’ approach 
survives Winter when applied as part of the four-element Winter test. In other words, ‘serious 
questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support 
issuance of an injunction, assuming the other two elements of the Winter test are also met.”); Citigroup 
Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund, Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(“The ‘serious questions’ standard permits a district court to grant a preliminary injunction in 
situations where it cannot determine with certainty that the moving party is more likely than not to 
prevail on the merits of the underlying claims, but where the costs outweigh the benefits of not 
granting the injunction.”).  
168.  Ingraham, 441 A.2d at 693.  
169.  Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (emphasis added).  
170.  Id. at 21.  
171.  Id. at 22 (emphasis added).  
172.  Id.  
173.  E.g., Kanter & Eisenberg v. Madison Assocs., 508 N.E.2d 1053, 1055 (Ill. 1987).  
174.  IB Prop. Holdings, LLC v. Rancho Del Mar Apts. Ltd. P’ship, 263 P.3d 69, 71 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2011) (citing Shoen v. Shoen, 804 P.2d 787, 792 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990)). 
175.  Wash. Fed’n of State Emps. v. State, 665 P.2d 1337, 1343 (Wash. 1983).  
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standards, requiring the plaintiff to show it “will suffer irreparable 
injury”176 
Courts also differ in how the various elements relate to each other. 
Some states, like many circuits’ interpretation of the Supreme Court’s 
standards,177 require that each element be independently satisfied.178 
Others specify that the criteria “are not to be applied woodenly or in 
isolation from each other; rather, the court of equity should weigh all of 
these factors together in determining whether injunctive relief is proper in 
the specific circumstances of the case.”179 Some of these states180—like 
some federal circuits181—expressly adopt a sliding scale, under which a 
stronger showing for some factors may offset weaker showings on others. 
Such differences can affect how courts apply facially identical sets of 
elements. 
B. Precedential Disparities 
The choice between federal and state equitable remedial principles 
determines not only the elements (or factors) governing the availability of 
176.  Ingraham v. Univ. of Me., 441 A.2d 691, 693 (Me. 1982) (per curiam) (emphasis added).  
 177.  Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 2016) 
(“[A]ny modified test which relaxes one of the prongs for preliminary relief and thus deviates from 
the standard test is impermissible.”); Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 838 F.3d 451, 457 (5th 
Cir. 2016) (“[S]atisfying one requirement does not necessarily affect the analysis of the other 
requirements.”); Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Winter 
articulates four requirements, each of which must be satisfied as articulated.”).  
178.  See, e.g., Shaw v. Tampa Elec. Co., 949 So. 2d 1066, 1069 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“[I]f 
a plaintiff fails to prove one or more of the elements required for an injunction, the trial court is clearly 
required to deny injunctive relief.”); Wash. Fed’n of State Emps. v. State, 665 P.2d 1337, 1343 (Wash. 
1983).  
179.  Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Emerson, 563 A.2d 762, 768 (Me. 1989).  
 180.  Smith v. Ariz. Citizens Clean Elections Comm’n, 132 P.3d 1187, 1191 (Ariz. 2006) (“The 
greater and less reparable the harm, the less the showing of a strong likelihood of success on the merits 
need be.”); DMF Leasing, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car of Md., Inc., 871 A.2d 639, 649 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 2005); Wells v. Auberry, 429 N.E.2d 679, 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (“[W]here there is a great 
danger of irreparable harm to the petitioner or the public, there is less of a need to go beyond the 
establishment of a prima facie case on the merits. . . . Conversely, as the imminence of irreparable 
harm is reduced, the prima facie case requirement expands to the test of probability of recovery on 
the merits.”).  
181.  See, e.g., Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.2d 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Under our ‘sliding 
scale’ approach, ‘the elements of the preliminary injunction test are balanced, so that a stronger 
showing of one element may offset a weaker showing of another.’” (quoting Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 
F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2012) (per curiam))); Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John 
Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009) (“How strong a claim on the merits is 
enough depends on the balance of harms: the more net harm an injunction can prevent, the weaker 
the plaintiff’s claim on the merits can be while still supporting some preliminary relief.”); see also S. 
Glazer’s Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2017) (“We 
have often cautioned that these are factors to be balanced, not prerequisites to be met.”).  
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equitable relief, but the body of precedent the court must consider in 
applying them. Even when the elements comprising federal and state 
standards for injunctions appear facially identical, federal and state courts 
may interpret and apply those elements very differently, creating different 
combinations of doctrines, presumptions, and holdings. An element is not 
a freestanding, self-defined concept, but rather a proxy for a particular 
jurisdiction’s body of cases identifying various sets of circumstances that 
either satisfy, or fail to satisfy, that requirement. At the very least, the 
choice between federal and state law determines the set of cases the court 
must use as guideposts in deciding whether to grant preliminary or 
permanent injunctions. 
Substantial discrepancies between some federal and state court 
rulings exist, for example, over the concept of irreparable injury. 
Numerous federal circuits have held that loss of employment, even when 
it involves reputational harm and total loss of income, does not qualify as 
irreparable injury because it constitutes a financial loss that post-trial 
damages could remedy.182 The U.S. Supreme Court adopted this 
conception of irreparability in the context of public employment cases. In 
Sampson v. Murray, it held that a terminated government employee’s 
“loss of income . . . falls far short of the type of irreparable injury which 
is a necessary predicate to the issuance of a temporary injunction.”183 The 
Court added, “[An] insufficiency of savings or difficulties in immediately 
obtaining other employment . . . will not support a finding of irreparable 
injury, however severely they may affect a particular individual.”184 
182.  See, e.g., Hetreed v. Allstate Ins. Co., 135 F.3d 1155, 1158 (7th Cir. 1998); Adam-Mellang 
v. Apartment Search, Inc., 96 F.3d 297, 300 (8th Cir. 1996); see also Hyde v. KLS Prof’l Advisors 
Group, LLC, 500 F. App’x 24, 25-26 (2d Cir. 2012); Dos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Med. 
Ctr., 684 F.2d 1346, 1349 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[A] temporary loss of income does not usually constitute 
irreparable injury because this deprivation can be fully redressed by an award of monetary 
damages.”). 
183.  415 U.S. 61, 91-92 (1974).  
 184.  Id. at 91 n.68; see also Beberman v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 675 F. App’x 131, 134 (3d Cir. 
2017) (“Even if [the plaintiff’s] position were no longer available for reinstatement at the time of 
judgment, a court could fashion a substitute alternative remedy as necessary.”); Beatrez v. Merit Sys. 
Prot. Bd., 399 F. App’x 581, 582 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (order) (“[L]oss of federal employment and 
earnings, humiliation, or damage to one’s reputation are not irreparable harms warranting interim 
relief in a case involving discipline of a federal employee.”); Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban 
Cty. Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 579 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The fact that an individual may lose his income for 
some extended period of time does not result in irreparable harm, as income wrongly withheld may 
be recovered through monetary damages in the form of back pay.”); Ciechon v. City of Chi., 634 F.2d 
1055, 1057 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that discharged civil service employees’ “loss of wages, 
employee benefits, and opportunities for promotion during the suspension period” did not constitute 
irreparable injury). 
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Some state courts have rejected this approach.185 The Michigan 
Supreme Court, for example, declared, “We can envision a variety of 
circumstances which might, in appropriate civil servant discharge cases, 
warrant a finding of irreparable injury sufficient to support the grant of a 
preliminary injunction.”186 It held that “the absence of usable resources 
and of obtainable alternative sources of income with which to support 
one’s self and one’s dependents” could constitute irreparable injury.187 
Other deviations between federal courts’ and some state courts’ 
conceptions of irreparability relate to real estate. Federal courts apply the 
traditional rule that, because real estate is presumed to be unique, both 
buyers and sellers may specifically enforce a contract to convey an interest 
in land.188 The New Jersey Chancery Division, however, has held that 
only buyers suffer irreparable harm when real estate contracts are 
breached.189 Even if land is categorically unique, the seller in a real estate 
contract typically loses only an ascertainable sum of money, which may 
be recovered in an action at law.190 The court consequently concluded, 
“[S]pecific performance relief should no longer be automatically available 
to a vendor of real estate, but should be confined to those special instances 
where a vendor will otherwise suffer an economic injury for which his 
damage remedy at law will not be adequate.”191 
States have sometimes departed from federal courts’ interpretations 
of traditional equitable principles in other areas, as well. The Delaware 
Chancery Court, for example, has held that a company’s failure to provide 
material disclosures to shareholders in advance of a shareholder vote is 
 185.  See, e.g., Stanton v. City of Chi., 532 N.E.2d 464, 468 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (affirming 
temporary restraining order prohibiting a city from forcing a police captain to retire); State Emps. 
Ass’n v. Dep’t of Mental Health, 365 N.W.2d 93, 100 (Mich. 1985) (“To the extent that Sampson 
appears to have been understood as a preclusion per se to a finding of irreparable injury in civil servant 
discharge cases, we decline to adopt that rationale.”); cf. Caras v. Am. Orig. Corp., Civ. No. 1258 
(1987), 1987 Del. Ch. LEXIS 467, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 31, 1987) (holding the plaintiff “will suffer 
irreparable harm if he cannot accept employment with his proposed new employer”). 
186.  State Emps. Ass’n, 365 N.W.2d at 100 (emphasis omitted).  
187.  Id. at 101.  
188.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1981). (“[T]he 
seller who has not yet conveyed is generally granted specific performance on the breach by buyer.”); 
see 12 JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 63.10 (2018); see, e.g., Stewart v. Griffith, 217 
U.S. 323, 326, 332 (1910) (Holmes, J.) (affirming, in a pre-Erie ruling, a decree granting the seller 
specific performance of a contract for the sale of land); Cathcart v. Robinson, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 264, 
278 (1831) (Marshall, C.J.) (“The right of a vendor [of land] to come into a court of equity to enforce 
a specific performance is unquestionable.”).  
189.  Centex Homes Corp. v. Boag, 320 A.2d 194, 196 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974).  
190.  Id.  
191.  Id. at 198; Suchan v. Rutherford, 410 P.2d 434, 444 (Idaho 1966) (denying petition for 
rehearing and reaffirming the court’s refusal to adopt “the majority rule that specific performance is 
available to a vendor upon breach by the vendee of a contract for the sale of real estate”).  
32
Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 10
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss2/10
2018] BEYOND THE ELEMENTS 489 
per se irreparable harm,192 while federal courts require shareholders to 
make further, case-specific showings of irreparability.193 Likewise, under 
Ohio law, a former employer suffers per se irreparable harm when an 
employee “with detailed and comprehensive knowledge of [its] trade 
secrets and confidential information” is hired by a competitor;194 again, 
federal courts have concluded otherwise.195 Florida courts have held that 
the existence of a common-law cause of action constitutes an adequate 
remedy at law that precludes injunctive relief, regardless of whether the 
defendant would be able to satisfy a judgment.196 Numerous circuits have 
held, in contrast, that “difficulty collecting a damage judgment may 
support a claim of irreparable injury.”197 
While many state courts allow a trust beneficiary to enjoin a trustee 
from breaching its fiduciary duties without regard to whether legal 
remedies could compensate the beneficiary for any harm it suffers, federal 
courts still require the beneficiary to show the breach of trust will cause 
irreparable harm.198 State courts have also held that a seller’s breach of 
contract inflicts irreparable injury when replacement products are not 
“readily” available or would be inconvenient to acquire.199 The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in contrast, held that a seller’s failure to 
 192.  See In re Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc., 954 A.2d 346, 360-61 & n.48 (Del. Ch. 2008); 
Wayne Cty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Corti, 954 A.2d 319, 329 (Del. Ch. 2008).  
 193.  See, e.g., Stein v. 1-800-Flowers.com, Inc., No. 16-CV-6252 (RRM) (RLM), 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 167147, at *14-15 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2016); Silberstein v. Aetna, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 8759 
(AJN), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49369, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2014); Masters v. Avanir Pharm., 
Inc., 996 F. Supp. 2d 872, 885-86 (C.D. Cal. 2014).  
 194.  Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 747 N.E.2d 268, 278-79 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); see 
also Levine v. Beckman, 548 N.E.2d 267, 271 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). 
 195.  Healthcare Mgmt. & Inv. Holdings, L.L.C. v. Feldman, No. 03-4140, 2004 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 28854 (6th Cir. Apr. 8, 2004); see also First W. Cap. Mgmt. Co. v. Malamed, 874 F.3d 1136, 
1143 (10th Cir. 2017).  
 196.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Yerex, 651 So. 2d 220, 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (citing 
Oxford Int’l Bank & Trust, Ltd. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 374 So. 2d 54, 56 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)).  
 197.  Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 206 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he 
unsatisfiability of a money judgment can constitute irreparable injury . . . .”); Tri-State Gen. & Trans. 
Ass’n v. Shoshone River Power, Inc., 805 F.2d 351, 355 (10th Cir. 1986); see Roland Mach. Co. v. 
Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 386 (7th Cir. 1984) (“A damages remedy can be inadequate . . . 
[when] [d]amages may be unobtainable from the defendant because he may become insolvent before 
a final judgment can be entered and collected.” (citing Signode Corp. v. Weld-Loc Sys., Inc., 700 
F.2d 1108, 1111 (7th Cir. 1983))); Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Adm. Merch. 
Maj. Freight, Inc., 511 F. Supp. 38, 42 (D. Minn. 1980), aff’d 642 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1981). 
 198.  See Benedict v. Amaducci, No. 92 Civ. 5239 (KMW), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3556, at *36 
n.13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1993).  
199.  Sedmak v. Charlie’s Chevrolet, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 694, 700 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).  
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convey a corporate jet did not irreparably harm the buyer, even though 
only three other similar planes were on the market.200 
Thus, federal and state courts may interpret and apply requirements 
for equitable relief such as irreparable injury or inadequate remedy at law 
differently. Accordingly, even when federal and state standards for 
injunctive relief appear facially identical, a federal court should still 
determine which body of law applies under Erie.201 
III. CONCLUSION: DIFFERENT BODIES OF PRECEDENT
A court should determine the proper body of law that governs the 
availability of injunctive relief, even when competing sets of standards 
involve facially identical elements, rather than simply assuming the 
choice-of-law issue doesn’t matter or that forum law automatically 
applies.202 It should treat each element within each potentially applicable 
jurisdiction’s standard as a proxy for a distinct body of precedent from 
that jurisdiction that presents different guideposts for resolving the issue. 
This principle obviously applies in the traditional Erie context, in 
which a federal court must decide whether federal or state law governs the 
availability of preliminary or permanent injunctions for state-law claims. 
It likewise applies in reverse-Erie situations203 in which a state court must 
decide whether to award injunctive relief under a federal statute,204 as well 
200.  Klein v. PepsiCo, Inc., 845 F.2d 76, 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 201.  As noted earlier, the Supreme Court should partly reverse Guaranty Trust and hold that 
federal standards govern the availability of preliminary and permanent injunctions for claims under 
the U.S. Constitution, federal statutes, or federal regulations, while state-law standards govern 
injunctive relief for state-law claims. See supra Part I.  
202.  Because each element of a jurisdiction’s doctrinal test is linked to the body of precedents 
from that jurisdiction interpreting or applying that element, it is incoherent for courts to apply federal 
standards for injunctive relief while interpreting them based on state law. See supra note 102. Of 
course, a federal court applying federal standards for injunctive relief must consider state-law issues 
to determine a plaintiff’s “likelihood of success on the merits” of a state-law claim or the availability 
of alternate state-law remedies. Federal law, however, would still govern how likely to succeed on 
the merits the plaintiff must be, whether alternate remedies qualify as adequate, how to apply the other 
factors governing injunctive relief, and how the various factors relate to each other (i.e., whether each 
must be independently satisfied, or they should instead be considered collectively under a sliding-
scale approach). 
203.  See Kevin M. Clermont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20-21 (2006).  
 204.  The propriety of injunctive relief under a federal statute is a matter of statutory 
interpretation. To determine whether and when a federal statute authorizes, mandates, or prohibits 
injunctive relief, a court (whether federal or state) must apply the standards that the statute itself 
explicitly or implicitly establishes. A federal statute that does not specify a remedy implicitly 
authorizes a court to grant equitable relief when traditional equitable principles, as construed by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, are satisfied. A federal statute that authorizes, but does not mandate, equitable 
relief—particularly as one remedial option among others—likewise permits such relief when 
traditional equitable principles are satisfied. However, when a federal law either mandates or prohibits 
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as in horizontal choice-of-law cases in which a court must decide which 
state’s law governs injunctive relief.205 The fact that federal and state 
standards, or competing states’ standards, for injunctive relief involve 
facially identical elements should not deter the court from deciding which 
body of law applies. Although beyond the scope of this article, such an 
approach might be even more broadly applicable to other choice-of-law 
situations, as well.  
A court should not require litigants to affirmatively demonstrate that 
competing bodies of equitable remedial principles may lead to different 
results before engaging in an Erie analysis. Once a party raises an Erie 
issue concerning the standard governing equitable relief,206 the court 
should generally adjudicate it without requiring that party to identify 
potentially dispositive distinctions between the competing bodies of 
precedent. Even when competing jurisdictions have not interpreted an 
element for injunctive relief in conflicting ways, their bodies of caselaw 
are not fungible. Differences will always exist among the fact patterns of 
the cases that have been adjudicated in each jurisdiction, the specific 
issues each jurisdiction has already addressed or has yet to confront, and 
how broadly or narrowly they cast their precise holdings in each case. It 
would be tremendously wasteful to require counsel (and the court itself) 
to parse two or more jurisdictions’ bodies of precedent to catalogue these 
innumerable subtle points of divergence before determining which body 
of equitable remedial principles applies. Particularly if courts come to 
agree that the body of equitable principles governing a claim derives from 
the same source of law from which the claim itself arises,207 these Erie 
and choice-of-law questions can be resolved with virtually no effort, 
eliminating any potential efficiency gains from requiring litigants to show 
that the competing bodies of law materially differ from each other. 
When confronted with a doctrinal test such as a jurisdiction’s 
standards governing injunctive relief, we should “pierce the veil” of the 
elements themselves, seeing through them to the body of precedents from 
that jurisdiction represented by each element. This approach offers a much 
injunctive relief, or clearly and explicitly identifies the circumstances under which an injunction 
should issue, those requirements supersede traditional equitable principles and must be applied. See 
Morley, supra note 13, at 277-78.  
 205.  As discussed earlier, however, choice-of-law determinations made pursuant to the Erie 
doctrine may differ from horizontal choice-of-law issues. See supra note 113.  
 206.  Courts generally do not raise choice of law issues sua sponte when the parties do not 
dispute the applicable law. But see, e.g., Michael T. Morley, Avoiding Adversarial Adjudication, 41 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 291, 303-04 (2014) (demonstrating courts need not necessarily accept erroneous 
stipulations of law).  
207.  See supra Part I; Morley, supra note 13.  
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more accurate, vibrant conception of the law,208 preventing courts from 
being misled by facial similarities between different jurisdictions’ 
doctrinal tests. 
208.  See KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 46-47 (2008). 
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